This paper examines the e®ects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997. We¯nd that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support. This is borne out two ways. (1) Counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to local governments. (2) When control of the state government changes, the distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party. We¯nd no evidence that parties reward electorally pivotal counties|counties that are near the median of the state or that have relatively high levels of electoral volatility (high swings). Finally, we¯nd that increased spending in a county increases voter turnout in subsequent elections. This suggests that parties have an electoral incentive to skew the distribution of funds to in°uence future election results, and the mechanism through which this works is \mobilization" rather than \conversion" of voters in a¯xed electorate.
Introduction
Political parties are teams of politicians and supporters seeking to gain control of the government. They are instrumental in choosing who will serve as representatives and in determining who holds positions of power after elections.
What do parties and their supporters get from control of government? Among other things, parties are thought to in°uence how the public dollar is divided|the distribution of public expenditures across regions and groups. The winning party, it is widely conjectured, rewards its supporters with pork, with a larger share of expenditures from existing programs.
Commenting on a press report that the Republican party redirected billions in spending to
Republican areas in the wake of the 1994 election, Republican majority leader Richard Armey quipped \to the victors belong the spoils." 1 This paper examines the relationship between party control and the distribution of public funds in the American states from 1957 to 1997. At the state level, we know of only one study that has estimated e®ects of party control on the distribution of public funds (Ansolabehere et al., 2002) . That study examines the e®ects of malapportionment on the distribution of public expenditures in the years surrounding Baker v. Carr, and, in passing, notes that the areas that give the highest support to the majority party receives a higher share of state 1 Quoted in David Pace, \1994 Shift Seen to Aid GOP Areas," The Boston Globe August 6, 2002, p. A5. Parties might also reward their supporters by changing the ideological bent of the government, or the general direction of government policy on broad issues, such as the overall size of government, spending priorities, and the general contours of economic and social regulation. An extensive literature examines the whether the governing party can increase the level of spending on particular programs that are central to that party's ideology, such as the Democrats and welfare. At the state level, there is little evidence that the majority party is able to increase spending on its preferred programs. Dye (1966) , Fry and Winters (1970) , Jones (1974) , Winters (1976) , Maquette and Hinckley (1981) , Winters (1985, 1990) , Lowery (1987) , Erikson et al. (1993) , and others explore policy di®erences across U.S. states and¯nd small, insigni¯cant, or \incorrect" e®ects of party control on policy outcomes. A few state-level studies¯nd strong evidence that party control matters in the predicted direction|e.g., Erikson (1971a) , Garand (1985) , and Alt and Lowry (1994) . Others¯nd mixed results|e.g., Keefe (1954) , Jennings (1979) , and Dye (1984) . At the national level, there are stronger correlations between a party's share of congressional seats and spending on programs that party favors. See, e.g., Ginsberg (1976) , Hibbs (1987) , Auten et al. (1984) , Browning (1985) , McCubbins (1985, 1991) , Lowery et al. (1985) , Budge and Ho®erbert (1990) , Alesina et al. (1993) , and Erikson et al. (2002) . Even at the national level, some studies¯nd miniscule or mixed e®ects|e.g., Kamlet and Mowery (1987) and Kiewiet and Krehbiel (2002) . But, as Kiewiet and Krehbiel (2002) and others point out, these correlations may not actually re°ect the causal e®ects of party control: shifts in the share of seats held by a party re°ect shifts in voter preferences.
expenditures. The present study tests more fully whether the majority party skews public funds toward its areas of core electoral support.
The relationship between party control, voter preferences, and the distribution of public funds is important in its own right as it is one way to assess who gets what from politics.
Our analysis also speaks directly to an important question engaging many theorists today. A number of recent papers have developed analytical models in which public expenditures are distributed across regions or groups in order to win votes or elections in the future. These models can be divided into two groups|\loyal voter" models and \swing voter" models, according to which segments of the electorate recieve higher shares of funds.
The strategy of targeting swing voters rests on the assumption that expenditures a®ect which party a voter will choose, rather than whether someone will vote. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) , Londregan (1995, 1996) , and others develop analytical models in which parties will target disproportionate resources to \pivotal" groups or regions.
2 In these models turnout is¯xed, so electoral competition is driven by e®orts at \conversion" rather than mobilization.
Loyal voter models take three forms. First, parties may simply seek rents, allocating more government spending on the projects and programs that bene¯t their members and supporters. Areas with relatively high concentrations of the majority party's supporters will then receive more money. Second, spending may mobilize people to vote, either directly or through interest groups that bene¯t from state contracts, rather than convert them. In this case, the optimal strategy is to spend more money in areas where a party has more of its own supporters (e.g., Kramer, 1964; Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Sim, 2002) . Third, shared responsibility and credit for programs may lead a party's politicians to spend money where there are more loyalists. When a single individual or party represents an area, it is a simple matter to reward (or punish) the incumbent. However, when many politicians of di®erent parties represent an area it is di±cult to share credit or send a partisan message.
Individual legislators, then, will seek to spend funds in ways that maximize the credit they or their parties receive. The strategy that maximizes the credit received by a party or the incumbents from a party receives will be to skew funds toward areas dominated by that party (e.g., Dasgupta et al., 2001 ).
These models may not be exclusive. It may be the case, for example, that parties choose to target both loyal and swing areas.
Research on party control of government and the distribution of public expenditures in the U.S. is surprisingly thin. Several studies of the U.S. federal government¯nd a positive relationship between the share of spending going to an area and the Democratic vote in the area (e.g., Browning, 1973; Ritt, 1976; Owens and Wade, 1984; Levitt and Snyder, 1995) .
This¯nding is consistent with the loyal voter models, but it is limited by the historical cases under investigation. Since Democrats were the majority party in Congress during the years studied the results might also re°ect the behavior of the Democratic party or the characteristics of areas that tend to vote Democratic.
3 Studies of the distribution of patronage by urban machines also¯nd that the organizations in control of their cities tend to reward their core supporters with patronage (Holden, 1973; Rakove, 1975; Erie, 1978; and Johnston, 1979) . Outside the U.S., Dasgupta et al. (2001) ¯nd that in India provinces where the governing parties are stronger receive larger shares of public grants.
Several studies¯nd evidence supporting the swing voter models in some contexts, but mixed or no evidence in other contexts. Wright (1974) ¯nds that the allocation of New Deal spending, federal grants, and employment depended on the volatility of the in presidential elections, though not whether the state was close to 50-50. 4 Outside the U.S., Dahlberg and Johansen (2002) ¯nd that the distribution of environmental grants across the 20 regions of Sweden is concentrated most heavily in electorally pivotal regions of the country.
3 Levitt and Snyder (1995) compare programs passed during years of uni¯ed Democratic control with programs passed during years of divided government. They¯nd that programs passed during uni¯ed Democratic control exhibit a pro-Democratic geographic bias, while those passed during divided government do not. Levitt and Poterba (1999) also¯nd indirect evidence that the majority party favors its core areas: areas represented by more senior Democrats tend to get more.
4 See also Wallis (1987 Wallis ( , 1996 and Fleck (1999) . Stromberg (2001) studies counties, and¯nds that the relationship between federal receipts and competetiveness vanishes when state¯xed-e®ects are included.
The states are ideal for measuring the e®ect of party control on the distribution of public funds. Party control varies considerably across states. All of the studies above have a limited amount of variation in the key independent variables|which party controls the government.
In the U.S. federal government, almost all of the cases have uni¯ed Democratic control or a Democratic legislature facing a Republican executive. Unlike the national government, we can contrast a large number of cases of uni¯ed Democratic control, uni¯ed Republican control, and divided control. A further strength of the state data is that party control of states varies considerably over time. This allows us to measure the e®ects of changes in party control and counties' partisan preferences on changes in the distribution of public expenditures. Within states, partisan preferences of the electorate vary considerably across counties and over time. And, the panel structure of the data allows us to hold constant many factors that are not readily measured.
Data and Methods
The Census of Governments provides reliable and comparable data on the distribution of state government expenditures over the last half century. The census collects these data at 5-year intervals, yielding a panel with 9 waves (1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997) and approximately 3,000 counties.
The dependent variable is per-capita intergovernmental transfers from the state government to all local governments inside the county, including the county government, municipal governments, school districts, and any special districts operating in the county. We study state intergovernmental transfers because this is the most comprehensive measure of the distribution of state funds across locales. Transfers encompass a wide range of programs, including education, highways and roads, hospitals and public health, housing, and welfare.
And, transfers account for 35-40% of all state government spending. Though not all funds, this is the most comprehensive measure of the distribution of state government spending across locales, and it is the variable used in numerous studies of the e®ects of political factors, such as voting power, on budget politics (e.g., Brady and Edmonds, 1967; Fredrickson and Cho, 1970; Ansolabehere et al., 2002) .
State transfers to local governments account for a large number of programs and a noticeable share of state and local spending, typically one-third of state spending and forty percent of local spending. Studies focusing on single programs typically cover¯ve percent or less of state or federal spending (e.g., Dahlberg and Johanssen, 2002; Herron, 2003) .
Two problems with direct analysis of transfers are that counties vary in populations and states vary in total intergovernmental revenues. To make the measure more readily comparable across counties and across states, we examine per-capita transfers for each county, and we measure these quantities relative to the state averages. Let i be a typical county in state j and year t. For each variable X, we de¯ne the new variableX asX ijt = X ijt = ¹ X jt , where
In most speci¯cations we take natural logarithms of the variables as well, and use log( There are a variety of ways to measure party control of the state government. To begin, we de¯ne each year in a state as being under Democratic control if (i) Democrats have a majority in both legislative chambers and the governor is a Democrat, or (ii) Democrats have a veto-proof majority in both legislative chambers. Republican control is de¯ned analogously.
If neither major party has control then we say the state is under divided control. Because budgets change incrementally, we construct a moving average of past control. Speci¯cally, we de¯ne a period of Democratic Control in a state as an 8-year period in which the state was under Democratic control for 4 or more of the years and the state was under Republican control for fewer than 4 years during the period (so 0-4 of the years could be years of divided control). Periods of Republican Control are de¯ned analogously. Periods that are neither Democratic nor Republican are under Divided Control. 6 We also varied the de¯nition of control, changing the length of each period (longer or shorter) and changing the number of years of control required to de¯ne a period of control. The results were qualitatively similar.
We chose to use the 8 year window as it seems to capture both the notion that budgeting occurs incrementally and that short-term changes in control a®ect the distribution of funds.
7
Most states switched party control at least once during the period under study. Thirteen states were controlled by the Democratic party throughout (AL, AR, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, TN, TX, VA, WV), and one was divided throughout (MI).
To measure the relative partisanship of a county's voters we average the county-level twoparty vote received by the Democratic candidates in all races for president, U.S. senator, and governor held over the preceding 8 years. Thus, for 1962 we using the elections of 1954-1960, for the entire period under study. We dropped Minnesota prior to 1972 for the same reason. We also dropped Alaska due to data limitations.
6 As an example, to construct the control variables for predicting transfers in 1962 we look at the period 1955-1962. 7 We are grateful to Robert Inman and Je® Milyo for their comments on this matter. A lag of at least two years seems necessary because the immediate budget is set by the prior government, not the immediate one. Professor Inman suggested horizons longer than 8 years because programs are long-lived and changes may occur at glacial pace. Professor Milyo favored an horizon shorter than 8 years, because 8 years smooths over many short-run shocks that a®ect control. One problem with the 8 year window, or any longer window, is that is stretches beyond the 5 year interval between Censuses of Governments. We also used 6, 5, and 4 year windows and found that the results are roughly the same as with 8 years, and sometimes even a little cleaner.
for 1967 we using the elections of 1960-1966, and so on. We call this variable the Average Democratic Vote in a county. We use the same window for measuring partisanship as for control.
Previous empirical research has generally employed two di®erent measures of the extent to which an area is politically pivotal. First, some studies de¯ne pivotal areas as those where the partisan balance is close to 50% Democratic and 50% Republican. Other studies de¯ne pivotal areas as those where the vote is highly variable from one election to the next (see Wright, 1974) . 8 We include both sorts of measures in our analysis. The variable Closeness to 50-50 is the absolute deviation of the Average Democratic Vote from the .5. The variable
Std. Dev. of Democratic Vote is the standard deviation of the Democrats' share of the two party vote over the preceding 8 years in all races for president, governor, and U.S. senate. 9
We also tried combining these measures into a single measure (the ratio of absolute deviation to the standard deviation).
Other political factors also a®ect the distribution of public spending. Two important variables highlighted in prior research are the level of turnout in a county and the degree of malapportionment. Ansolabehere et al. (2002) show that, before equalization of state legislative district populations, overrepresented counties received substantially greater shares of funds from the state than underrepresented counties. We include the variable Relative Representation Index to capture this e®ect. 10 Stromberg (2001) argues that, other things equal, politicians will reward areas with higher turnout, because the number of potential votes to be won is greater. Empirically, Levitt and Snyder (1995) , Stromberg (2001) , and others¯nd that turnout positively e®ects transfers. We therefore include a measure of 8 An alternative approach is to measure the fraction of Independents or moderates in a state. Dahlberg and Johansen (2002) attempt this using Swedish survey data for regions of that country comparable to states. It is impossible to¯nd adequate survey data for U.S. counties.
9 The standard deviation is taken around the county mean (not 50 percent). This is the measure introduced by Wright (1974) .
10 This is the variable used by Ansolabehere, et al. (2002) . Other papers¯nd similar e®ects of malapportionment in other contexts. See Atlas et al. (1995) , Lee (1998) , and Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) for studies of federal spending in the U.S. states; see Gibson et al. (1999) for a study of Argentina and Brazil; see Rodden (2001 Rodden ( , 2002 for studies of the German Lander and the European Union; and see Horiuchi and Saito (2001) for a study of Japan.
Turnout, de¯ned as the average number of votes cast per-capita in all races for president, governor, and U.S. senate during the preceding 8 years.
Beyond political considerations, a variety of demographic factors directly a®ect state transfers. Because many transfers are for education, poverty, health, and welfare programs, we expect that school aged population, median or per-capita income, poverty rates, and percent elderly a®ect levels of transfers. We also include the percentage of the population that is African American. Also, because of \incremental budgeting", county population is likely to negatively a®ect the levels of expenditures. If there are lags in adjusting the allocation of transfers to population shifts, then as a county's population grows it's percapita transfers will automatically fall. Economies of scale might also lead to a negative e®ect of population on per-capita transfers.
The sources for all variables used in our analysis are in appendix Table A.1.
The E®ects of Party and the Distribution of Funds
A simple analysis is immediately instructive about how party and partisanship shape the distribution of state spending. more money when the Democrats control state government (the¯rst cell in the row) than when Republicans control state government (the last cell), and they receive 5% more money when the Democrats control than when control is divided (the middle cell). Republican counties show the opposite pattern: they receive 8% less money when the Democrats control the state government than they do when the Republicans are in control. The mixed counties receive about the state average regardless of who controls the state government.
Second, consider the distribution of funds across counties, holding constant which party controls government. When Democrats control the state government, strongly Democratic counties receive 10% more from the state than one would expect, and strongly Republican counties 9% less than the state average. When Republicans control state government, the di®erences across counties are small.
The data o®er little support for the swing voter models. A central prediction of such models is that parties will target areas that are closely divided and may swing the election.
Counties that split their vote relatively evenly between the parties do not receive more than the average county. Averaging across conditions of party control, the swing counties received a .01 share of relative transfers. In other words, they received, on average, about 1 percent more money than one would expect given their share of state population. This is not signi¯cantly di®erent from 0, which would mean that these counties received almost exactly the share of funds one would expect given their populations|not more. Democratic counties received about 4 percent more than one would expect and Republican counties received about 4 percent less than one would expect. within states often include demographic factors like total population, income, and schoolaged population. These may be correlated with partisanship in ways that might make Table   1 misleading. In particular, it appears that there is a net transfer from Republican counties to Democratic counties, which likely re°ects modest income transfers within the states.
To control for other factors, we exploit the panel structure of the data. We include county and year e®ects.
11 The panel regressions then are analogous to regressing di®erences in the dependent variable on di®erences in the independent variables. In addition, we include county-level measures of income, poverty, school aged population, and elderly population.
The estimated coe±cients and standard errors are shown in Table 2 .
[ 14 This¯nding is consistent with the¯ndings of previous studies on malapportionment and the distribution of public¯nances (see footnote 12 above). The more representation per person an area has, the greater the share of funds per person that area receives.
Lagged turnout also has a noticeable e®ect on transfers|areas that historically have high rates of voting relative to the state average receive more state money. A county that has had a voting rate one standard deviation above the state average over the previous eight years (the average is about 35%, and the standard deviation is 10%) is predicted to receive 3% more money from the state than the average county.
The demographic and socioeconomic controls all have the predicted signs (except, perhaps, Percent Age 65 and Over), and are quite signi¯cant. On average, a county receives relative more transfers per-capita when it becomes smaller and poorer, and when the number of school age children per-capita increases.
In the third column of Table 2 we drop the Turnout variable, because it is arguably endogenous, even though lagged. 15 Importantly, the results are essentially the same as in column 2.
Importantly, our¯ndings re°ect changes in party control within states as well as variation in control across states. We restricted the sample to states where party control changes at least once. The results are substantially the same as those reported in Table 2 .
To further test the robustness of these estimates, we ran the panel analyses for each state separately using the speci¯cation in column 2 of Table 2 . These regressions exploit changes in party control and pivotalness within counties in each state. Analysis on the full model 13 This e®ect is identi¯ed via the large discrepancies in state legislative district populations at mid-century, and the interventions of the courts in the mid-1960s requiring equalization of district populations. See David and Eisenberg (1961) , and Ansolabehere et al., (2002) .
14 A county with a Relative Representation Index of 1 has exactly the state average amount of representation. The standard deviation of the Relative Representation Index is about 1, so we consider a change from 1 to 2.
15 The problem here is not true endogeneity or simultaneous determination, but omitted variables. We estimated the speci¯cations in Table 2 Overall, our results point to a simple conclusion: transfers to local governments in the American states go disproportionately to areas where the state's majority party has strongest 18 So, e.g., for observations in 1977 we use the average presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial vote from 1969 to 1976 within each state. We considered other cuto®s as well, including 3%, 7%, and 10%. The results are the same.
19 The coe±cients on the interaction terms were substantively small|none bigger than a plus or minus .04|and each had t-statistics smaller than 1.20. support, and transfers are steered away from areas where the opposing party is strongest.
Such¯ndings are broadly consistent with \loyal voter models" and inconsistent with \swing voter models."
Electoral Incentives
Why reward loyal areas? As mentioned in the introduction, three sorts of politics might sustain this pattern: (1) mobilization, (2) credit-claiming, and (3) rent-seeking. These arguments, of course, are not exclusive. All three might contribute in varying degrees to the empirical pattern observed. Also, credit-claiming may be a special case of mobilization, as the electoral gains to incumbents may come either through mobilization or conversion. 20
Here, we focus on the assumption that spending mobilizes voters, as that is su±cient to sustain a loyal voter model. Analytical models conjecture that increases in spending spur higher turnout in subsequent elections. Government expenditures might produce higher turnout for a variety of reasons. Raising the number of jobs dependent on state grants and contracts might make people in an area feel that they have a greater stake in what government does and therefore that their votes matter personally. Also,¯rms and organizations (especially unions) that depend heavily on state funds may be more likely than other¯rms to mobilize their employees to vote. Table 2 o®ers some evidence that electoral behavior is correlated with spending. Areas with higher levels of turnout in prior elections receive larger shares of per-capita transfers from the state governments. Do increases in public expenditures lead to higher turnout?
Previous research on the electoral e®ects of spending and transfers has focused almost exclusively on U.S. congressional elections, particularly on the measuring the electoral value to incumbents of \bringing home the bacon." Researchers estimate the e®ects of public spending programs on vote shares of parties or incumbents. Findings are mixed, with earlier papers¯nding little e®ect and more recent work suggesting larger e®ects (e.g., Johannes and McAdams, 1981; Stein and Bickers, 1994; Alvarez and Saving, 1997; and Levitt and Snyder, 1997) . We know of no research that looks for e®ects of public spending programs on turnout.
We exploit two features of the panel of states to identify the causal e®ect of Transfers on Turnout. First, we estimate the e®ect of spending on turnout within counties over time, essentially regressing di®erences in turnout on di®erences in spending. Possible simultaneity between spending and turnout remains. Second, we construct an instrument for spending using reapportionment of the states in the 1960s. We use court-ordered reapportionment as a quasi-experiment to estimate the e®ect of spending on turnout. The degree of malapportionment varied dramatically across counties within states and across states. Legislative bargaining under malapportionment produced highly unequal distributions of public spending, which the imposition of equal population representation reduced substantially (Ansolabehere et al., 2002) . Court-ordered reapportionment, then, o®ers a strong potential instrument for changes in a county's share of intergovernmental transfers within counties over time.
21
The dependent variable is Total Turnout as a fraction of population, averaged over the 2 governor elections subsequent to a speci¯c census. For example, the expenditures recorded for 1957 in the Census of Governments are assumed to a®ect turnout in the 1958 and 1962 governor elections.
22 To remove state-year e®ects and to facilitate interstate comparisons, each county's turnout is divided by the state turnout in the relevant years.
The key predictor of turnout is Share of Intergovernmental Transfers. In the least squares panel model, this is an exogenous variable. Because we include¯xed e®ects for each county, the coe±cient on this variable re°ects how changes in transfers translate into changes in future turnout. In the instrumental variables estimates, Share of Intergovenmental Transfers 21 Of course, for this change to provide a valid instrumental variable, malapportionment must not a®ect turnout directly. Past research on the direct electoral e®ects of reapportionment has found little evidence of a systematic e®ect of malapportionment on state-level electoral competition (e.g., Erikson, 1971b) . In our data the cross-sectional correlation between the degree of malapportionment and the electoral competitiveness of a county is just -.11; the within-county correlation between change in malapportionmnent and change in competitiveness is just -.07.
22 We also considered a shorter lead time of 4 years and found similar results. We use 8 year period to remain consistent with the analysis in section 3.
becomes an endogenous included variable. The¯rst stage regression predicts this variable using the county's share of legislative seats relative to its share of population, i.e., the Relative Representation Index, and other exogenous variables.
As control variables, we included lagged turnout, various demographics, and electoral closeness. Lagged turnout and demographics are important because many other factors account for turnout. It should be noted that the relationship between spending and turnout might imply that lagged turnout should not serve as a control variable in the analyses reported in Table 2 . Sensitive to this possibility, we performed the analyses with lagged turnout included and not. We also include year e®ects to capture short-term variations and trends in turnout.
23 Table 3 presents results from four di®erent speci¯cations, depending on whether estimation uses least squares or instrumental variables estimators and on whether lagged turnout is included or not.
[ Table 3] Turnout depends positively and signi¯cantly on the county's share of state transfers percapita in all speci¯cations. The estimates imply that a standard deviation rise in transfers boosts turnout modestly. Speci¯cally, the within-county standard deviation in per-capita share of transfers is .26. The predicted e®ect of a one standard deviation increase in percapita shares of transfers ranges from 1:3 in speci¯cation (1) to 3 in speci¯cation (3).
It should be noted, that the coe±cients di®er across speci¯cations, but not widely. The instrumental variables estimates are somewhat larger than the least squares estimates. Including lagged turnout lowered the estimated coe±cients only slightly.
A central question of accountability remains unanswered: how do voters reward parties?
We have implicitly assumed that all voters respond to Transfers the same way under all conditions of party control. Republican and Democratic turnout is assumed to increase at the same rate regardless of who is in power. One might expect a di®erential e®ect across parties if there is the possibility of di®erential mobilization or that spending does convert some voters. Is this assumption reasonable, or are partisans especially motivated to vote when their own party is responsible for an increase in transfers to a county?
To explore these questions, we examined whether the e®ect of Transfers on Total Vote for speci¯c parties depends on which party controls the government. We consider three dependent variables: the total number of votes in a county as a fraction of county population Table 4 we control for demographic and electoral factors. Unfortunately, we cannot perform IV estimation as there are three potentially endogenous variables and only one instrument (Relative Representation). We are comfortable with the estimates, though, because of the similarity between the IV and least squares results in Table 3 . The full results of the interacted estimation are presented in Table 4 .
[ Table 4 ] Two important patterns emerge in Table 4 . First, the e®ects of party control are symmetric across partisan groups. An increase in transfers to a county increases turnout regardless of the partisanship of the district and regardless of which party controls the government. Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with the notion that parties may gain by redirecting public funds to core areas. Increasing spending in an area increases turnout| of supporters and non-supporters in roughly equal numbers. Increasing spending in core areas is likely to yield net electoral bene¯ts through higher participation rates, consistent with the mobilization argument.
What is clearer from our analysis of electoral incentives is the importance of turnout.
The distribution of public expenditures directly a®ects turnout. Parties can gain, therefore, by targeting their core areas. Again, the exact mechanism deserves closer attention. This may work through interest groups aligned with a party|such as¯rms the contract with the government and labor unions, which mobilize their workers to vote. It may also work directly through the voters, who may be dependent on the government or who may reward and punish the majority party for it's willingness to spend money on important programs.
Conclusions
We have documented that state transfers to local governments show a distinctly partisan bias. From 1957 to 1997, areas where the majority party within states have higher levels of electoral support received, on average, larger shares of state transfers. We¯nd little or no support for the notion that parties target areas with high numbers of swing voters. In this respect, our¯ndings contradict recent theoretical analyses by Lindbeck and Weibull and Dixit and Londregan (see also Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Chapter 8) , which predict that pivotal areas will get more. At least in the American states, they do not.
We have further identi¯ed a potential°aw in this line of theory. The Lindbeck-Weibull and Dixit-Londregan models assume that government spending does not a®ect turnout.
The results in Tables 2 and 3 provide substantial evidence that turnout is indeed tied to government spending.
This¯nding points to another sort of theoretical model of the electoral motivations behind public¯nances|one that operates through turnout. Suppose government spending and the credit-claiming it engenders produce more voters but change few minds. How should parties best appeal to the electorate? Spending resources where there are a high fraction of supporters only mobilizes supporters. Spending funds in areas with large numbers of uncommitted voters or areas that are evenly divided might not help a legislator or party's electoral prospects. Such a strategy would mobilize some supporters, but also some opponents. Spending resources in an area where there are many opposition voters would clearly be counter productive. The best strategy, then, is to devote disproportionately more resources to areas where there are high concentrations of a party's supporters. Kramer (1966), Cox and McCubbins (1986) and Sim (2002) o®er simple decision-theoretic and game-theoretic models that capture this logic.
The link between government spending and turnout also allows us to draw clear comparisons of the American states with other electoral circumstances. As discussed in the introduction, the loyal voter and swing voter models have been examineed in at least three other contexts: U.S. federal government expenditures (Levitt and Snyder, 1995) , Indian national government expenditures (Dasgupta et al., 2001) , and environmental grants in Sweden (Dahlberg and Johanssen, 2002) . In Sweden, there is some evidence that resources go disproportionately to \battleground" areas with high fractions of undecided or independent voters. Like the American states, intergovernmental transfers and expenditures by the U.S. federal government provide evidence that parties shift resources to areas with more loyal voters. Expenditures by the Indian national government exhibit a mixed pattern.
Variation across electoral contexts may be consistent with the importance of turnout in distributive politics. In Sweden, turnout is very high. The marginal returns to mobilizing new voters may be slight, so politicians and parties must, instead, convert people who might back one party to switch allegiances. Marginal increases in expenditures, then, are likely to have only slight e®ects on future turnout. In the U.S. and India, turnout is comparatively low. In this context marginal increases in turnout may be easily made through higher government spending.
Whatever the precise motivation, it is clear from our analysis that in the American states the distribution of state transfers to local governments, accounting for forty percent of local government expenditures, shows evidence of a substantial partisan bias and clear evidence against the swing voter model. A¯nal observation is in order not about party control, but about the lack of party control.
Over the course of the Twentieth Century, the U.S. has witnessed a distinct trend toward divided party government in the states and nationally (Fiorina, 1992) . What might be the consequences for public¯nancing? Our results reveal, interestingly, that states with divided party control have more equitable divisions of intergovernmental transfers than states in which one of the two major parties holds majorities in the upper and lower chambers as well as the executive o±ce. When states are divided neither party can skew the distribution of public expenditures toward areas where it enjoys high levels of support. Nor do the electorally pivotal or swing areas bene¯t excessively when control is divided. Ultimately, then, our results point to one reason voters that may prefer divided control of government:
Split party control of government produces more equitable divisions of public expenditures. 
